4 Lessons in Personal Effectiveness from an Overrun U.S. Army Combat Outpost
The Battle of Kamdesh was a clash that happened on October 3, 2009, in which an estimated force of 300 Taliban fighters assaulted the infamously ill-positioned Combat Outpost (COP) Keating, a small American military outpost in Nuristan province, Afghanistan.
60 men of U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division (along with 2 brave Latvian soldiers handling a platoon of Afghan National Army) stationed in COP Keating would play a central role as the ground element in the following twelve-hour firefight.
With this imbalance of strength, the fact that the Americans suffered only 8 killed and 27 wounded is a testament to the resolve of the men of COP Keating and the speed of American response (especially air assets). This will later be confirmed with the slew of medals awarded for bravery that day, including two Medal of Honor recipients, Staff Sergeant Clinton Romesha and Sergeant Ty Carter.
Since then, many accounts of the battle have emerged, including an official investigation report, movies, and books. One of said books is titled Red Platoon, written by Staff Sgt. Romesha himself.
Besides giving a vivid first-hand view of the harrowing fight, this book also allows us to glean lessons — beyond the military tactics — from the ordeal faced by these men, such as…
1. Seemingly-irredeemable people can possess unexpected positive qualities
The picture above is the then-First Lieutenant Andrew Bundermann. He was the leader of Red Platoon, part of the Black Knight Troop stationed in COP Keating. An excerpt from the book nicely paints a picture of this gentleman:
“Andrew Bundermann was a history major from the University of Minnesota who’d made a serious (and extremely successful) effort to amass the absolute minimum number of credits necessary to graduate so he could spend the rest of his college tenure ‘cocktailing’”
Here’s another excerpt depicting the first exchange between 1LT Bundermann and SSGT Romesha:
“All right, here’s the deal … I like to chew tobacco, I like to drink beer, and I don’t like to work very hard.”
So, not exactly Major Dick Winters here.
But when the Taliban attacked that fateful morning, the actual troop commander, Captain Stoney Portis, was away on an observation trip to another post one helicopter lift away. Worse, he was stuck there since there was no way a helicopter can go to Keating while it’s still hot with enemy fire.
This meant the command of the post fell to 1LT Bundermann.
Throughout Romesha’s account of the battle, we are exposed to the other side of 1LT Andrew Bundermann, the professional soldier with remarkable calmness and combat judgment.
He seamlessly stepped up into command after waking up to enemy RPGs, coordinating the battle from the command post, requesting fire support and air assets, relaying situational report to higher-ups, and — at times — reining back Romesha from making overly-aggressive decisions that would have exposed the outpost to unnecessary risk. He was awarded the Silver Star, later upgraded to Distinguished Service Cross (2nd-highest decoration for combat gallantry) for his actions.
Bundermann was by no means the only person demonstrating this. In fact, Romesha made clear in the beginning of the book that these soldiers are not saints, are not exemplary citizens. They have their weaknesses, they have their problems (one soldier, Sgt. Thomas “Raz” Rasmussen, was a meth addict before joining the Army). But that doesn’t automatically mean they won’t step up when the time comes.
The takeaway: Personally, this is a reminder not to discount people too easily because of first impressions, surface observations, or negative past history.
2. When sh*t hits the fan, you fall back to your level of training
This is a widely-known saying, but the case of COP Keating is a powerful reminder. The complete quote is “you don’t rise to the occasion, you fall back to your level of training.” In the book, we can see numerous occasions where unpreparedness would have significantly worsened the situation.
Staff Sgt. Armando Avalos, a forward observer, wouldn’t have been effectively guiding indirect fire towards enemy positions if he was busy remembering step 4 of the Six Elements of a Call for Fire.
Air Force Captains Mike Polidor and Aaron Dove, F-15E pilot and WSO, wouldn’t have been able to step into the role of tactical air coordinator managing 19 aircrafts (while avoiding enemy fire, conducting strafing and bombing runs, double-checking grid coordinates to ensure they don’t bomb U.S. troops, and keeping the plane airborne), if they haven’t been trained many times to make calls while dealing with information overload; a feat that later would earn them Distinguished Flying Crosses.
The takeaway: Train, and train hard. You don’t want to find out exactly how unprepared you are when it’s time to “rise to the occasion”.
3. There are times to be measured, and there are times to be undeniably aggressive
In most military literature, “going cyclic” — a term referring to holding your rifle’s trigger to unleash continuous, automatic fire — is generally frowned upon, as weapons are rarely accurate after the first 2–3 shots, leading to waste of ammunition.
Of course, when you’re trying to suppress back heavy enemy fire directed at you, that theory goes out the window, which is what SSGT Romesha and other soldiers did in the book.
We see several examples of unforgiving aggressiveness with minimum care of conservation. Chucking out grenades every 30 seconds after “cooking” (holding them for a moment before throwing so the enemy can’t throw it back) — both generally not advisable practices. Entering rooms while spraying bullets (vs. careful steps of ensuring positive identification, followed by measured center-mass shots if required).
However, there are situations (this battle included) where the rules go out the window, as conservatism wouldn’t mean a thing if you’re dead.
The takeaway: The key is being able to identify when that threshold to aggressiveness have been passed, and to be able to turn it on — hard.
4. Small mistakes, concessions, and trade-offs compound
A big discussion around The Battle of Kamdesh is why COP Keating is there in the first place. Located in the “bowl” at the bottom of the valley, it defies one of the oldest adages of armed combat: “seek the high ground.”
While I don’t possess the situational awareness of the people in charge back then, it is hard to justify the decision, especially when many soldiers voiced their concerns against the outpost in the first place (the book mentions the specialist initially in charge of briefing this location gave the COP codename “Alamo”).
The remoteness of this part of Afghanistan also cause difficulties to reach outposts by land, and air transport can get hindered by the weather at times, reducing the effectiveness of any mutual support the different outposts can give each other.
This pattern would be seen throughout the book, such as:
- Opening COP Keating itself, despite the unfortunate location, was deemed necessary as part of a strategic effort to cut off Taliban routes along the border of Pakistan
- When Army brass finally listened to the pleas to close the COP, the actual closing was delayed — AFTER some closure efforts have been underway — due to a local governor’s request to stay until an upcoming elections to project the Afghan government’s credibility. This stretched the outpost given that the defenses have been weakened in anticipation of closing (such as defunct Claymore mines around the perimeter not replaced, reduced medical supplies).
- Diversion of air assets (attack helicopters) from a nearby base to strengthen an offensive in other parts of the country caused Keating to be starved of air support in the critical early hours of the battle.
The takeaway: Easy to say in hindsight, but all of us must maintain holistic view when making seemingly-small concessions, as well as (importantly) trade-offs.
